Introduction
Among the legal professionals the Polish Code of Obligations of 1933 1 has deservedly enjoyed the reputation of an outstanding piece of legislation.
2 It continues to attract a great of deal of interest: both for legal scholars preparing their lectures and courts working on their judgments it remains a favourite quarry of exemplary regulations.
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and Articles 405-414 KC 10 ) or treat the two as discrete bodies of law ( § §1041 and 1432 ff . ABGB; also French doctrine and COFI). 11 In the Polish Code of Obligations unjust enrichment (Articles 123-127) and undue payment (Articles 128-133) are entered separately in Section II: Obligations Arising from Other Sources. Articles 128-130 specify the circumstances justifying a claim for the restoration of an unjustly appropriated benefi t; Art. 131 and 132 introduce the exceptions; and, fi nally, Article 133 contains references to the rules concerning unjust enrichment ( §1) and a clause extending the liability of the accipiens in case he was aware of irregularity of his dealings ( §2). The KZ also indicates that the latter action can only be granted with regard to private transactions; taxes and levies are expressly declared out of bounds.
12
The Code's separation of the two actions refl ects the standpoint of Longchamps de Bérier. He concedes that unjust enrichment and undue payment usually go hand in hand (even if the former results from the latter), yet, he insists, there are also situations when this is not the case. For example, suppose a mail order company (the solvens) sends you a book you have not ordered, asking you to return it in case you do not accept the off er. If you (formally the accipiens) do not accept the off er, the book does not become your property. Enrichment has not taken place, and yet it does not invalidate in the least the solvens's demand that the goods be returned. Alfred Ohanowicz has little patience with this ambiguity. In his view, the goods either become the accipiens's property, a state of aff airs that qualifi es automatically as enrichment, or, if he does not accept the transfer as a benefi t, i.e. there is no co-operation on his part, the performance simply has not taken place. Either of the two authors pauses to dicuss the example of a piano player foregoing to play the instrument on the mistaken belief that he was obliged not to disturb his neighbour. Here, for once, they agree that this uncalled for display of self-restraint constitutes an act of undue payment which does not result in unjust enrichment. Yet it remains a true legal conundrum. The transfer did take place, but it is impossible to make out what exactly the accipiens should or can return to the pianist. 13 The majority of lawyers believe that in essence undue payment is no diff erent from unjust enrichment. They see in undue payment a variant of unjust enrichment in a situation when the solvens seeks redress for lost benefi ts he conferred upon the defendant 10 A. Ohanowicz However, that is contradicted by the fact that they are separated in the Code and that each has its own schedule of liabilities. In French jurisdiction there has been a tradional distinction between unjust enrichment that resulted from undue payment (Articles 1235 , and 1376 -1381 and other cases where the claims are modelled on the Roman actio de in rem verso. in the belief (animo solvendi) that he was fulfi lling an obligation, but the obligation did not exist. In all other cases of unjust enrichment the state of mind of the solvens is irrelevant.
14 Intent (animo solvendi) would therefore have to be the distinctive feature of undue payment; however, we cannot be too sure as Art. 133, Point 3 which admits some restituition claims for acts performed with no specifi c intent. The problem did not escape the attention of the commentators. Whereas Ignacy Rosenblüth drew attention to the fact that "the condictiones listed in Art. 128-133 do not consist in the enrichment but in the performance's absence of basis", Ludwik Domański argues that undue payment retains its distinctive character only within the law of obligations, while unjust enrichment occurs in many areas of law, e.g. material law, family law, inheritance law, etc. 
Legal ground in claims for restitution
The legal rules detemining the criteria of admissibility of claims for restitution are usually discussed in connection with the Roman system of condictiones. Although contemporary systems of law no longer mirror the classical approach to undue payment, the echoes of the Roman law still resound in today's rules.
In the interwar law publications the condictiones were presented within the civil code framework, with the Roman terms in brackets. Ludwik Domański's commentary on the Code of Obligations was the only exception to that rule. 16 He groups the actions in restitution under three heads: a) condictio indebiti (recovery of what was paid or delivered to another in error), b) condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam (if the fulfi lment of obligation violates a legal or moral norm the claim is deemed invalid); c) condictio ob causam datorum, sive causa data, causa non secuta, vel fi nita (recovery of what was given to another in anticipation of an act providing a legal justifi cation of the transfer or if such an act had existed but became invalid). To round off this typology he adds the fourth heading, condictio sine causa (recovery of what was obtained by the accipiens without any legal cause, or grounds recognized by the law).
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In this study the condictiones will be discussed in the order dictated by the time lapse between the moment of the cessation of the legal cause and the moment of the contested transfer taking place. Articles 128 and 130 deal with situations when the claim was invalid ab initio, already at the moment of the transfer, because the legal cause was either totally absent or void. This is the ground covered by the Roman condictio indebiti, condictio ob turpem causam, condictio ob iniustam causam, and in a way condictio sine causa. Art. 129 brings together two types of circumstances. At the beginning it refers to situations when the legal cause was valid at the moment the transfer was performed, but later ceased to be valid or its validity was rescinded. This corresponds to the Roman condictio causa fi nita. The second part of Art. 129 deals with situations when the contested transfer occurred while the legal cause, though missing, was expected to materialize or come into force in the future, but eventually failed to do so. This fi ts in well with the condictio causa data causa non secuta.
The term causa, which is crucial for these Roman maxims, has long been noted for its multiple meanings. 17 The following three predominated in the interwar Civil Law literature: a/ causa effi ciens, or the source of obligation, e.g. an affi davit, a tort; b) causa impulsive, or a personal motive which gives rise to an obligation (it includes causa remota, or a further aim of the obligation); c) causa fi nalis, or the legal basis of the obligation, i.e. the contractual agreement between two or more persons; the performance of the obligation (real contracts); or the disposition to transfer goods or benefi ts to the possession of another on a gratuitous basis. Causa fi nalis was also treated as causa proxima, determining the direct aim or purpose of the obligation. In the case of gratuitous obligations causa proxima and causa remota were indistinguishable.
18
The term "legal ground" appears only in Art.129, in which condictio causa fi nita could actually represent causa effi ciens (e.g. the repeal of a legal norm concerning a certain kind of property transfer). Moreover, in context condictio causa data causa non secuta could mean causa effi ciens or causa fi nalis depending on whether the focus is on the fulfi lment of the obligation by the solvens in anticipation of the conclusion of a contract or the reception of the matching obligation respectively. It seems that the former is fully justifi ed. In the circumstances described in Art. 128 and Art. 130 the claim was based on the absence of causa effi ciens (the parties were not bound by contract, i.e. condictio indebiti, condictio ob inuistam causam) or causa impulsiva (the contract between the parties envisaged an illegal or immoral outcome, i.e. condictio ob turpem causam).
The proper positioning of condictio sine causa in the system of condictions is a major problem. Here, we have taken the view that it is not necessary to employ that maxim in the discussion of claims of unjust payment. In cases where the obligation was to be voided Roman law had at its disposal the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam and condictio sine causa, which clinched the system of condictiones. The latter was used when none of the other condictions could eff ectively be used in a case of enrichment that was by all accounts unjust, especially when the legal system off ered no causa fi t for that purpose. It is exteremely diffi cult to demarcate the domain of condictio sine causa or to set out how it relates to other condictions. What complicates the problem of condictio sine causa even more, apart from its own fuzzy nature, is the history of the condictions in general. Prior to their introduction to Byzantine lawyers their names were unknown to classic Roman law. 19 According to Fryderyk Zoll Sr, the term condictio sine causa covered both claims that were invalid ab initio as well claims that became invalidated after the initial transaction (which is tantamount to condictio causa fi nita).
20
In his analysis of the concept of unjust enrichment in Austria and in France Wiktor Lenz notes that condictio sine causa has no clear scope and is used as a supplementary remedy, especially in hard cases involving invalid contracts. He also points out that in the legal systems of those countries the border between condictio indebiti and condictio sine causa is based on the distinction between undue payment ex personis and ex re. The solvens who transfered the benefi t directly to the wrong accipiens (i.e. who was not the legitimate creditor) could take advantage of the condictio indebiti. If, however, there was no debt, he could make use of another condiction, for example condictio sine causa.
21
About the extent to which the Polish Code of Obligations shadowed the condictions opinions were divided. Fryderyk Zoll Jr is sure condictio sine causa could be discerned in Art. 130.
22 Ludwik Domański goes even further and declares that "the right to demand the restoration of unjust enrichment in Articles 123-127 refl ects the condictio sine causa in general". On the other hand, Roman Longchamps de Bérier and Ignacy Rosenbluth never even mention that condiction in their commentaries.
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Fryderyk Zoll Jr illustrates the application of condictio sine causa with a situation when a sum of money changes hands whereby the solvens is convinced that it is a loan while the accipiens thinks it is a gift. Wiktor Lentz invokes the same example as an instance of condictio indebiti because indebitum presupposes an understanding, shared by both parties, that a transfer of benefi ts has taken place. 24 Finally, we should mention some of the remaining condictions known to Roman law. The condictio causa furtiva for the recovery of stolen property from the thief had the character of a criminal prosecution; the condictio possesionis was an instrument for the restitution of a thing obtained by way of unjust enrichment; and the condictio scripturae allowed the debtor to demand the return of the written admission of debt (the chirograph) if the obligation to repay debt was discharged or if the promised loan was not paid out by the solvens. The scope of the Roman condictions was broader than that of the modern concept of unjust enrichment. One may wonder if the reason for dividing the condictions between Article 128 and Article 130 is in fact de Bérier's intention to rule out the demand for restoration in situations when "the obligation became valid after the performance of the obligation" (Art. 130 in fi ne). An example which demonstrates the point of such a distinction is the delivery of a gift to make up for the consequences of a fl awed contract (Art. 358, para. 2). As Art. 128 refers to the nonexistence of obligation and Article 130 to a vitiated obligation, the fi nal phrase of Art. 130 about convalidation could refer solely to cases within the scope of that article. You can convalidate or put to rights an act which is vitiated, but you cannot amend something that does not exist. At the same time, however, the Uzasadnienie concedes that the formula from Article 130 in fi ne is not requisite because in an action for the return of the object of undue payment the defendant can come up with the claim that the restoration, should it be carried out, was not fi nal as long as the initial act of obligation could still be pronounced valid. Article 128 gives the right to demand the restoration of undue payment to the person that "at the time of the transfer was under no obligation to the accipiens" ( §1 in fi ne). As we have argued earlier, the hypothesis of Article 128 encompasses also cases of invalid obligations from Article 130. Article 128 would then be employed in cases when the transfer was carried out to fulfi ll the obligation (animo solvendi). 31 If we are to take our cue from the Roman jurisdiction this condiction should only be used with regard to benefi ts conferred within the system of nominate contracts prescribed by law. In all other cases, i.e. when the benefi t transfer was based on an innominate contract, the right choice would be the condictio causa data causa non secuta.
32
The meaning of "benefi t" (Pol. "świadczenie", Ger. "Leistung") in this legal context is very extensive; it includes every description of action or omission to act as well as the 29 R. Longchamps de Bérier, Zobowiązania, p. 223-224. 30 Uzasadnienie, p. 184-185. 31 For a diff erent view cf. I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 256 . He claims that Article 128 was also applied in cases where the benefi t was conferred to put the other side under obligation (animo obligandi), e.g. by an advance payment. Let's note, however, that such situations are covered by Article 129, while Article 128 clearly refers to animo solvendi ("to perform an obligation").
32 P. Księżak, Świadczenie niegodziwe, p. 9.
Jan Halberda contraction of various obligations like issuing promissory notes or warranties, etc. 33 Of all the legal systems under consideration only German law permits expressis verbis the plaintiff to avail himself of a condiction even when the obligation has been discharged ( §812 II BGB). The functionality of this arrangement appears to be connected with the relatively abstract nature of the German legal procedure.
34 Some legal system, including the CN and COFI, conceptualize the problem of disputed (undue) obligations in terms of payment of debt (as e.g. Article 1235 CN). That shuts out, or makes it very diffi cult to bring in, the condictio indebiti, which covers all kinds of benefi ts, services or favours, giving rise to the liability for unjust enrichment.
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The Polish Code of Obligations makes room for actions based on condictio indebiti (Article 128). It can be fi led by a solvens if there was no debt in the fi rst place (indebitum) or if there was a valid contract but the solvens was not the debtor, the accipiens was not the creditor, and none of them acted as a representative, contractor, negotiorum gestor, etc. In the tripartite model invoving a solvens as the apparent debtor, an accipiens as creditor and a third party who is the accipiens' real debtor, the claim for the restitution of undue payment should be directed against the accipiens who received the payment (expressis verbis Article 1377 I CN). In French jurisdiction (Article 1377 II KN) the solvens is entitled to pursue his claim against the real debtor if in consequence of payments the latter, acting in good faith, has destroyed the records of the debt history, or -given the subsequent judicial decisions -has let go of the pledge. If the solvens discharged the debt directly to the accipiens for the benefi t of a third party under a mistaken belief that he was obliged to do it, he is not permitted to use a condiction to sue the accipiens. He has, instead, the right to bring an action in unjustifi ed enrichment against that third party. 36 Making condictio indebiti unavailable to the accipiens has been justifi ed by the fact that he got what -on the basis of an agreement with the third party -he was entitled to. At the same time the solvens carried on doing what he wrongly thought he ought to for the sake of the third party. However, as the benefi ts did not in fact pass from the solvent to the third party, the restoration claim has to be based on unjust enrichment rather than the condictio indebiti. If the roles were altered, i.e. the solvens who was the real debtor passed on the (undue) benefi ts to an accipiens who was not the true creditor, the condiction would be the proper instrument for the solvens and unjust enrichment for the true creditor.
Condictio indebiti could also be used in cases when there was a debt agreement between the solvens and the accipiens, but the delivered goods or services were diff erent 33 E.g. the Supreme Court heard a case of conferred benefi t which consisted in entering into an obligation by issuing promissory notes (Judgment of 21 September 1934, C.I. 481/34; discussed below in Section 7c).
34 For a discussion of the signifi cance of claims in unjust enrichment in a system of law which admits abstract juristic acts cf. J. Halberda 37 It would likewise be applicable in cases of alternate obligation when the solvens, unmindful of the terms, did not make a choice or delivered the things on both sides of the disjunction (as in the explicit wording of §1436 ABGB), or when the solvens, unaware of the option to substitute a secondary obligation for the primitive one, fulfi lled the latter. 38 The undue obligation on the part of the solvens could refer to a part of a discharged obligation. For example, the obligation to pay amounted to 100 zł, but the sum actually paid was 110 zł.
Cases of discharged obligation by a solvens who was unaware of the plea of peremptory exception (except when it enforced a natural obligation) are treated in the Code of Obligations in the same way as cases of nonexistent debt. Furthermore, condictio indebiti could also be invoked in a claim born out of a conditional obligation when either the resolutory condition or the suspensive condition came into being before the obligation was discharged (Article 46 §2).
Not all actions could take advantage of condictio indebiti; the exclusions were subject of specifi c regulations. So for instance the claim for the recovery of a payment discharged before it fell due, i.e. prematurely, or before a reciprocal payment by the other party, is declared not actionable in Article 128 §2. Analogous regulations can be found in the legal systems of other countries (cf. Art. 1186, para. 2 CN; §1434 in fi ne ABGB; §813 II BGB; and Art. 411, point 4 of the Civil Code). The rationale for this restriction is clear to see -the debtor would have to fulfi ll his obligation in due course anyway. The only exception form this rule -known also to Austrian, French and German law -is the premature payment by a solvens who lacks the capacity to enter into legal agreements.
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The exclusion of the claim for the recovery of undue payment described in Art. 128, para. 2 does not apply to situations when the discharge of obligation was obtained by deceit, threat or the solvent was a victim of exploitation (Articles 39-43). In these circumstances the claimant could resort to the condictio indebiti unless -and that was the only exception -the time for the discharge of the obligation had run out. Then the only course of action left to the solvens is to fi le a claim for damages (Article 134 ff ). According to KZ the duty of restitution lapses if "the obligation after being discharged has become valid" (Article 130 in fi ne). The examples can be found in specifi c regulations, eg. the defect of legal incapacity can be cured by the confi rmation of the contract by a person with legal authority to act on behalf of the minor (Article 53) and the defects of an ad solemnitatem formula by the performance of a donation (Article 358, para. 2).
Article 130 is connected with the provision of Article 56 that "contracts contrary to public order, an act of law, or good customs are invalid". However, Article 132 restricts the right of action to a solvens who is guilty of illegal or immoral conduct. To sum up: the solvens could resort to condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam (Article 130) only when the transfer of benefi ts had no legal justifi cation because the obligation was invalid under Article 56 and at the same time the situation was not covered by the hypothesis of Article 132.
In Roman law the condictio ob turpem causam is used to allow the solvens to recover benefi ts from an accipiens whose continued possession of them would violate the values of morality, equity and decency, and would thus be unacceptable. KZ takes the same line in cases involving the restitution of a conferred benefi t whose aim was to induce the accipiens to the omission of an illegal act. 42 Although there would be nothing wrong with the solvents' intention nor the act itself, handing out rewards for not committing illegal acts "off ends our moral sense and undermines the legal order [and so] makes the whole contract serve an immoral aim". 43 Exceptionally, the claim for recovery can be allowed if the benefi t changed hands on the understanding that there existed no obligation. Such a situation is described in Article 131, point 3: "if in order to get approval of a request that is right and proper an applicant gives a bribe to an offi cial who has given him to understand that without it he would have to wait for a decision that may never come". 44 The question whether the bribe achieved its purpose or not is in this case immaterial. However, KZ denies the use of the condiction ob turpem causam to a solvent who acted with an illegal or immoral intention, for example a giver who bribed an offi cial on order to get a licence, or who paid rent for premises used for prostitution and illegal gambling.
In Roman law the condictio ob iniustam causam applies in situations where the retention of the benefi t by the accipiens would be wrong, but not on account of immorality or breach of good customs. The most common examples when this condiction was granted included the reclamation of a marital gift, a prize in an illegal game, and proceeds of usury. part of an obligation (agreement, legal act) that was nonexistent, invalid, or possibly defective. Here are some specifi c examples illustrating the range of its applications:
-the contract was invalid because its object or purpose was contrary to public order, the law, 46 good customs; or it demanded things impossible to perform (Article 56); or the required, validity-conferring formalities were not complied with (Article  109) 47 as a result of false show or lack of good faith vitiating the promise (Articles 31-34) or the admission of a person in a state of unconsciousness or under a disability; -the legal act was invalidated because the declaration of will (affi davit) was vitiated -it was was obtained by deceit, threat or the solvent was the victim of exploitation (Articles 39-43);
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-the legal act was incomplete -it was in need of confi rmation, for example by a person with legal authority to act on behalf of the minor who entered into the agreement (Article 53) represented by a person without power of attorney (Article 101). 
Invalid legal ground -condictio causa finita
For our discussion of the condictiones we have assumed a single criterion, namely the point in time at which the performance took place. In those discussed so far the legal justifi cation was nonexistent already at the moment of payment (transfer of the benefi t).
The following analyses will focus on two remaining variants -the legal ground ceased to be valid as the performance was taking place, or, the cessation occurred afterwards (Article 129 in principio). The latter includes the situation when the legal ground was expected to come into being in the future, but failed to materialize (Article 129 in fi ne) 50 48 According to Wiktor Lenz it is not important whether the invalidation came about through a revocation or a judicial decision, or whether it took place before or after the transfer of the benefi t; what matters is that that works backwards, and clears up the fi eld ex tunc from the outset (cf. W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, . This interpretation, representative of the interwar consensus, is not shared by contemporary jurists who have hardly any doubt in assigning this case to the sphere of condictio causa fi nita (cf. P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, and P. Mostowik [in: ] System prawa prywatnego, p. 303).
49 J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, Article 129. A person may demand the restitution of a transferred benefi t when the legal ground fell away or did not materialize because the envisaged purpose of the benefi t was not achieved. Article 129 in principio is applied in cases when the legal ground existed at the moment of the transfer of the benefi t (causa preaterita), but was later knocked out (causa fi nita). Thus the condictio causa fi nita may be invoked when the benefi t was transferred on the basis of:
-a legal norm which was later invalidated; 52 -a judgment ordering enforcement which did not become fi nal, but was changed before coming into force (the same applies to administrative decisions);
53
-a conditional contract when the resolutory condition was met. 54 The diff erence in the application of condictio causa fi nita and condictio indebiti is determined by the sequence of events (transfer of the benefi t and the fulfi lment of the condition). The former is applicable when the performance of the obligation took place before the condition came into being whereas the latter is used when the sequence was reversed (and consequently the obligation was invalidated prior to the performance); -a contract was cancelled (no matter whether the cancellation was to include all obligations ex tunc or merely those that were still pending, ex nunc), for example if an advance payment for future expenses was provided prior to the cancellation and a simultaneous claim for the recovery of the outstanding balance of the advance sum, or if an advance payment was followed by a cancellation or dissolution of the contract without recognizing the prepaid sum as discharged obligation; -a prenuptial agreement which specifi ed the amount and the terms of the dowry transferred from the bride's parents upon her marrying, but the marriage that was later dissolved.
56
The only debatable issue here was right choice of condiction in the case of contract concellation when the accipiens' performance became objectively (i.e. without his fault) impossible (Article 267). For, it can be argued, if the accipiens' termination of an agreement had ex nunc consequences, the condictio indebiti had no grip. Instead, the claim is to be matched with condictio causa fi nita or condictio causa data causa non secuta (which of them is up for debate). Ludwik Domański illustrates his argument with this example of a termination of lease: one month after signing the contract the tenant (the solvens), who had paid his rent in advance, decided to give notice because of faults or damage (e.g. a fi re) that made the premises untenantable (Article 376). In his opinion, it was a case of condictio causa data causa non secuta because the landlord (the accipiens) was unable to pass on the benefi t, a nonperformance which preconditioned the action of the tenant (the solvens). If the premises are damaged, the purpose of the transfer of benefi ts, i.e. allowing the tenant to make use the premises (Article 370), cannot be accomplished. The logic of this argument is based on the identifi cation of the causa in the wording of the condiction with the aim or purpose (causa fi nalis) of the accipiens' performance and not its legal ground (causa effi ciens), i.e. the contract.
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Other authors take a diff erent view, which appears more convincing. They match the cases where the performance was frustrated after the contract had been made through no fault of either party with condictio causa fi nita. They insist that the causa should be construed as causa effi ciens, i.e. the termination of the contract, and not a cancellation, which implies that the object or purpose of the mutual transaction became subsequently unattainable. They point out that the key word in Article 267 para. 1 is "wygasa" ("is extinguished"), and that cannot refer to anything but the contract, i.e. the causa effi ciens. Consequently, the solvens is entitled to claim the recovery of the benefi t he had transferred before the contract was found non-binding. If, however, the price was sent to the buyer, but the seller ran out of stock and was not able to deliver, Roman Longchamps de Bérier would grant the buyer the right to invoke condictio causa fi nita.
58 Contemporary doctrine took great care to distinguish between situations where a contractual obligation became impossible to perform through no fault of either side from a move, available to a party to a contract, to cancel it and to demand restitution of the benefi ts already rendered if the other party deferred the reciprocal delivery as agreed (Article 250ff ). In the latter case the failure to perform constitutes a breach of contract giving the non-breaching party the right to seek redress in the courts. Under Article 129 in fi ne the claim for recovery could proceed in accordance with the instrument of unjust enrichment, focused on the accipiens' liability (Article 127). In case of claims connected with the cancelation Jan Halberda of the contract (Article 250 ff .) the solvens is entitled to seek the restitution of all his contractual contributions as well as damages for delay.
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6. The purpose of the benefit transfer proved elusive -condictio causa data causa non secuta If a benefi t was transferred in the expectation of attaining a certain goal and that goal was not attained, the action for the recovery of the transferred benefi t should invoke the provision of Article 129 in fi ne. It corresponds to condictio causa data causa non secuta (condictio causa data non secuta, condictio ob causam datorum, condictio ob rem datorum). In Roman law it does not matter why the causa lapsed. 60 Of the legal codes that were in force in Poland in the interwar period only the German BGB includes the condictio causa data causa non secuta in §812 (likewise OR Article 62, para. 2). Elsewhere the claim for recovery of undue payment in the same circumstances is a matter of judicial decision based on case law (per analogiam with Articles 1376-1381 CN and §1435 ABGB). The claim is not recognized by Russian law.
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The authors of the interwar period insist that the condiction cannot be granted unless the parties explicitly and forcefully specifi ed the purpose of the benefi t in the text of the agreement (for example in the form of a condition). A specifi c, personal objective (whether a causa impulsiva as in the Polish term "pobudka" (a direct motive, or urge to act) or a long-term goal, causa remota) does not count unless it is mentioned in the contract with an emphasis that leaves no doubt about its importance.
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Present-day consensus favours the interpretation that causa in that condiction means causa effi ciens, applicable for example in the case of contracts that were cancelled. Cases of prepayment or inducement to act in a certain way are exemplary of condictio causa data causa non secuta: here the benefi t changes hands although the parties are 59 L. Domański Rosenblüth; he suggests that to make the personal objective of the contract fully eff ective it would have to be included among essentiale negotii of the contract. Roman law treats purpose as one of the special arrangements of a transaction (accidentalia negotii); the indispensable essentialia are the name of the goods, their quantity and price. It seems that Rosenblüth's remark put him among those who were in favour of greater explicitness and clarity in the articulation of purpose in the text of contracts (cf. I. Rosenblüth [in:] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 261). Meanwhile Wiktor Lentz, after analyzing the provisions of the German law, takes the opposite view (W. Lentz, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 102): the purpose (goal) of a contract should be plain to see, although it does not have to be stated in the text expressis verbis. It is suffi cient for it to be connected with the judicial act as its essential element; at the same time, however, the belief (state of mind) of one party that the other party enters into the agreement in order to achieve a particular aim is not enough. Cf. also J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 190. not bound by an obligation, i.e. the giver does not act solvendi causa. 63 Interwar jurists (cf. Note 62: L. Domański, W. Lentz, J. Namitkiewicz, and I. Rosenblüth) stressed the importance of the intended purpose mentioned in the contract, yet their examples hardly diff er from those used today (e.g. advance payment or acknowledgement of the receipt of loan). The apparent discord is a matter of approach: from their perspective the contract is essentially an agreement about the purpose (goal) of the transfer of benefi ts. Here are some of the typical situations which, in their opinion, could be handled with the use of the condictions:
-in Roman law the mere threat of using condictio causa data causa secuta puts pressure on the other party of an innominate contract (with no right of action) to make them deliver;
64
-the benefi t was transferred together with an off er which was not accepted by the off eror; 65 -an advance payment had been made in the expectation of entering into a contract, an event that did not materialize;
66
-benefi ts were transferred under a conditional contract, but the suspensive condition was not fulfi lled;
67
-a receipt of loan had been given to the lender, but the loan was not paid out; or, a document confi rming the performance of an obligation had been handed out, but the obligation was not discharged;
68
-a dowry had been established and paid out, but the planned marriage was cancelled. French, Austrian and German laws are very clear about the liability and the restitution of all that had been handed over for the sake of a marriage that eventually did not take place (Article 1088 CN, §1247 ABGB, and §1301 BGB);
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-the benefi t was transferred to the accipiens for his advantage, but he spent it on something that had not been envisaged by the parties to the agreement; benefi ts were transferred to induce the accipiens to do something, e.g. to appoint an heir, which he then failed to do; a donation had been made, accompanied by a sub Jan Halberda modo obligation, which the donee failed to satisfy; a donation mortis causa had been made, but the donor outlived the donee; a conditional heir or legatee fulfi lled his obligations, but in spite of that his name was struck off the will or was prevented from entering upon the inheritance.
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Exclusion of claims for restitution
The provisions of the KZ, especially Articles 131 and 132, 71 set forth the situations where claims for restitution of conferred benefi ts could be barred, even if, in the light of Articles 128-130, they may appear undue. The exclusion of such claims was buttressed further by Articles 88-89 (on interest) and 128 para. 2 (cf. point 4 a).
Articles 131 and 132 deal for the most part with benefi ts that can be claimed back under the provisions of Articles 128 i 130 in principio, i.e. cases where the legal ground was missing from the very beginning. Originally they were to be put immediately after Article 128, but their ultimate placement is due to the fact that in some cases Article 131, point 2 could also apply to a benefi t exposed to claims based on condictio causa fi nita (Article 129 in principio) -although the legal ground was invalidated, the moral obligation remained. 
a) Natural (imperfect) obligations
Natural obligations form a heterogeneous group whose individual elements have in common two interlocking determinants: the solvens is denied the right of action for the restitution of the benefi ts already conferred, and the accipiens has the right to retain the benefi ts (soluti retention). The term is of Roman orgin (obligatio naturalis) and has been incorporated into Romance legal systems (CN). German-speaking literature makes a distinction between liability and indebtedness, but fi nds claims not based on positive law unenforceable. In the German legal system the type of obligation upon they rely is regarded as imperfect ("unvollkommene Verbindlichkeit"). It seems that Polish jurists 70 W. Dajczak, T. Giaro, F. Longchamps de Bérier, Prawo rzymskie, p. 522; M.Sobczyk, Zamierzony cel świadczenia nie został osiągnięty, p. 1019; F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 199. 71 Art.131. The claim for restitution of a benefi t is barred: 1) if the right to bring action for the recovery of debt is denied by statute or because of the statute of limitation has expired; 2) if the conferred benefi t complies with a moral duty, expectations of decency or custom; 3) if the person transferring the benefi t willingly knew he was not obliged to do, unless he reserved for himself the right to claim the benefi t back, the transfer was done under duress, or it was a legal act prohibited by law or whose purpose is turpitudinous.
Art. 132 §1. Whoever pays another person willingly for the carrying out of an act that is illegal or violates good manners, or in order to induce him to carry out such an act, has no right to claim the return of what he paid.
§ 2. Likewise a person who fulfi lled an obligation by carrying out a legal act with a turpitudinous purpose if the turpitude was on his side has no right to bring action for recovery. 72 Uzasadnienie, p. 185.
have for the most part used the term "zobowiązanie naturalne" which is equal to the natural obligation (positive law has taken no notice of it).
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Before the Polish system came into force in the interwar period natural obligations were recognized in all mature legal systems that existed in Poland except the Russian Imperial law. Their enforcement depended on two legislative techniques. The fi rst one is associated with the CN, which declares in Article 1235 that the voluntary fulfi lment of a natural obligation does not justify a claim for repayment based on condictio indebiti. The identifi cation of specifi c cases of natural obligations is left to case law and legal scholarship.
The other method can found in codes of the German branch of law (ABGB, BGB) and in KZ. They do not proclaim a general rule as in Article 1235 CN, instead they list the specifi c unactionable ("nicht einklagbare") natural obligations. So §1432 ABGB disallows claims for the recovery of a payment of debt beyond the statute of limitations, a debt which is invalid only because of defective form, a debt which is hard to match with a claim. The provisions of the German Civil Code mention the following imperfect obligations: debts after the statute of limitations ( §222 II BGB), a reward for "information about an opportunity" to be used for the conclusion of marriage ( §656 BGB), debts and obligations that arose from games and betting ( §762 and §764 BGB), and "compliance with a moral duty or the rules of social propriety" ( §814 BGB).
According to KZ "a benefi t is not recoverable 1) if the right to bring a claim for the recovery of debt is denied by statute, or the debt has been found time-barred; 2) if the conferred benefi t complies with a moral duty, [expectations of] decency or custom" (Article 131, points 1-2). The hypothesis of Point 1 encompasses the following examples:
-payment of time-barred debt (as in §1432 ABGB; §222 II BGB; Article 63 OR; Article 411, point 3 KZ; French case law). An error in the application of the statute of limitation does not matter, i.e. a payment made on the erroneous assumption that the debt was still owed cannot be claimed back;
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-payment of debt that could not be recovered in court because of the expiry of the limitation period (explicitly in §1432 ABGB) 75 or because of its nature, i.e. it involved obligations from games and betting (Article 610 §1; §762 BGB, and also Austrian, French, and Swiss legislation); 76 73 The Supreme Court held that "there is hardly any diff erence between a natural obligation and one which is barred by statute" (Supreme Court Judgment of 6 April 1936 (C. II. 2845 /35, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1936 . Cf. also L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 581-582; Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne (naturalne) w Kodeksie zobowiązań [Imperfect (Natural) Obligations in the Code of Obligations], "Nowy Kodeks Zobowiązań" 1936, Nos. 16-17, p. 62 . 74 The statute of limitation was taken into account when it was pleaded by the debtor, and the court was not in a position to bring it up ex offi cio (Article 273). Cf. L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 576, 582, 584; Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 75; I. Rosenblüth [in: ] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, . 75 The courts would not admit the plea of ignorance of the preclusion. Cf. L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 582. 76 All the commentors point out that a claim for the recovery of a benefi t conferred out of fear -connected with the misapprension that the law does enforce obligations from games and betting -that the other side may go to court to enforce payment. Having said that, it should be possible to bring action for the recovery of a benefi t conferred under the misapprehension that the game or bet was lost. In the latter case the ; debts arising from loans to purchase alcohol; 78 debts reduced through a bankruptcy or creditor arrangement procedure.
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The source of duties mentioned in Article 131, point 2 are "the injuctions of religion, morality, honour and decency, that is standards of behavior generally accepted in society at large and among friends and acquaintances". The examples under this rubric were similar to those found in §1432 ABGB, §814 BGB, Article 63 OR and in the constructions of the French case law. 80 Among the benefi ts representing moral obligations or expectations of decency are maintenance and alimony payments in cases not covered by the law, e.g. to concubines, 81 relatives, 82 as well as all every description of dependents (indigents, the chronically ill, the elderly, other people's children).
83 As a rule the recovery of benefi ts given away to those categories of persons could not be claimed back unless it was done on behalf of a third party without authorization (cf. . At the same time, the recipient of this form of support was not entitled to claim its continuation if the provider decided to cut it.
recovery is justifi ed not by the outcome of the game or bet, but by the fact that there was no reason for the payment to have been made, not even natural obligation. Cf. Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 66; J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, Komentarz, p. 264) places them in the category of moral obligations (Article 131, point 2). Other commentators agree about the legal consequences (recovery is out of the question), but diff er widely about the legal qualifi cation. So L. Domański would have such claims dismissed on the basis that the purpose of the transaction was incompatible with good manners (Article 132, para.1). The Supreme Court's refusal to grant a condiction in this case was justifi ed by the solvens' taint of turpitude (Supreme Court Judgment of 21 September 1934, C.I. 481/34, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1935, item 135; cf. also in 7c below). It seems, however, especially in the light of the Supreme Court's judgment that the treatment of the claim for recovery may be decided on a case by case basis; i.e. it may depend on whether the benefi t was conferred to induce the accipiens to become a concubine (a case of turpitude, as in the ruling mentioned above) , or whether it was transferred because the recipient was a concubine (a case of compliance with an extralegal duty).
82 So, for example, the Supreme Court held that a "father in law who provided free maintenance for his son in law may not bring a claim in unjust enrichment for the recovery of his expenses, if he provided the maintenance in a free and voluntary manner in the spirit of moral duty, as a father in law towards his son in law, and not in order to obtain an appropriate recompense". More precisely, "the claimant… provided the defendant… in the course of a year with breakfasts, dinners, teas and suppers to the tune of 75 złotys per month". Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 18 , C.I. 2368 /36, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1927 83 Z. Fenichel, Zobowiązania niezupełne, p. 63, 66.
Other situations aff ected by the bar of Point 2 include donations to charity, churches and religious institutions; presents off ered to others on various occasions; Christmas or fi nancial year end bonuses and gifts given to employees.
The benefi ts described in Article 131, point 2 -for example the maintenance and alimony payments -could be higher then the statutory ones, but that did not open the door to prospective claims. The law is equally fi rm in barring claims for recovery of benefi ts transferred on the mistaken assumption that it is legally enforceable obligation. An exception to that rule is the situation where claimant acted under the erroneous belief that the child who received the benefi t was his own. 84 In accordance with Article 355, para 3 regulations concerning donations, including formal requirements ad solemnitatem and claims for the recovery of donated property do not apply to the provisions of Article 131, point 2. 85 The treatment of natural obligations vitiated by a defective ad solemnitatem formula diff ers from country to country. In Austria §1432 ABGB in no uncertain terms bars the recovery of a benefi t conferred in fulfi lment of an invalid contract on account of defective form ad solemnitatem, by declaring such a transaction an act of natural obligation.
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Similarly in French law: a donation inter vivos signed in private, which was not enforceable until the donor's death, becomes a natural obligation, and if the will is found invalid it is because the required form was not complied with. Moreover, obligations incurred by a minor and not confi rmed by his legal guardian are treated as natural obligations. A condition cannot be used to challenge the fulfi lment of this type of obligation.
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On the ground on German, and also Polish law, the abovementioned obligations are not regarded as natural, but void ab initio. In eff ect, the conferred benefi ts can be recovered. De Bérier's Uzasadnienie fi nds the BGB system more convenient because it checks the expansion of the realm of natural obligations and thus prevents them from interfering with the enforcement of specifi c statutory regulations of legal procedure and legal capacity. With regard to the legal status of minors the authors of the KZ take the view that a minor cannot assume a legally binding obligation, but can pay a debt owed by somebody else, "if a minor had money to spend, he did well paying off a debt rather than wasting it". 88 b) Knowledge of an obligation not owed A claim for the recovery of a benefi t cannot be granted to a person who transferred it while he knew he was not obliged to do it (Article 131, point 3 in principio; §1432 in fi ne ABGB; §814 BGB; Article 63 OR, and Article 411, point 1 KC). The lawmakers' reasoning behind this provision is that if the solvens knew he was under no obligation to 84 W. Lentz Jan Halberda the person to whom he transferred benefi ts, he was acting gratuitously, and the benefi ts are gifts to donee. Their advice to the claimant was "to put up with the consequences and stop pestering the courts with his vexatious claims for recovery". 89 As a result, the claim of undue payment could be brought only by a solvens who transferred the benefi t by mistake, under the misapprehension that there was an obligation that he had to fulfi ll.
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Crucial to the rejection of the claim is the solvens' positive awareness that there is no obligation (on him); the law is not interested in whether it was possible for him to get informed on this point or whether there were doubts about it. Nor does it matter whether the misapprehension represents a mistake of fact law or mistake of law. This is clearly stated in §1431 ABGB; other legal systems judicial decisions and academic doctrine gradually came to the same conclusion (in France, Germany, Poland 91 , and -after some misgivings -in Switzerland). Roman law, and later also German law, insist that the solvens' mistake be exculpable. This requirement has been waived in Austrian, Swiss and Polish law.
92
The burden of proving that the solvens was aware of the absence of an obligationi.e. did not act under misapprehension, which would deprive him of the right to bring a claim for recovery -usually lies with the accipiens (so in Austrian, German, Polish, 93 and Russian law).
The solvens is required to prove that a/ he completed the transfer of the benefi t, b/ it was undue; which allowed the law to presume that c/ the act was performed under mistake. The role of the accipiens is to refute that claim by proving that the solvens was not under mistake and well aware of the lack of obligation, i.e. was acting animo donandi. The solvens' knowing error is treated as a negative (exclusionary) condition of the admissibility of the action in recovery. 89 R. Longchamps de Bérier, Zobowiązania, p. 226. 90 L. Domański, Instytucje Kodeksu zobowiązań, p. 587; and I. Rosenblüth [in: ] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 259 . "The error must accompany the transfer of the benfi t and indicate that there exists an obligation which is being fulfi lled", cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 5 July 1935 , C.II. 600/35, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1936 . In another ruling the Supreme Court held against a tenant who claimed a reimbursement of overpaid rent, as he had not been acting under mistake at the time of payment. Cf. Supreme Court Judgment of 16 February 1937 , C.II 2507 /36, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich, 1937 Cf. Supreme Court Judgments of , C.I. 1642 92 P. Księżak, Bezpodstawne wzbogacenie, p. 20, 22 and 210; J. Namitkiewicz, Kodeks zobowiązań, p. 193; I. Rosenblüth [in: ] J. Korzonek, I. Rosenblüth, Kodeks zobowiązań. Komentarz, p. 265; and F. Zoll Sr, Pandekta, p. 196 . Following §814 BGB German law rules out the use of condiction as soon as it is found that the solvens was not sure about the existence of doubt. In its judicial practice the Polish Supreme Court took a diff erent line and held, following the ABGB, that the nature of the solvens' error is immaterial (i.e. whether it is exculpable), even to the extent of clear negligence. French law which, following into the footsteps of Roman law, treats the mistake as appositive condition of admissibility of a condiction. That, of course, results in shifting the burden of proof in the lawsuit. In marked contrast to other legal codes, the CN sets forth the following conditions of admissibility of a condictio indebiti: a) the payment was discharged; b) it was undue, c) the performance was carried out under mistake (Articles 1376-1377 CN). Now it is the solvens who has to demonstrate that he acted under a misapprehension. Switching the burden of proof gives rise to extraordinary diffi culties in the presentation of evidence for it requires the solvens to make out a case that he was unaware of the absence of an obligation. Faced with such an accumulation of negativities the courts tried to be liberal in their assessment of the occurrence of the mistake; sometimes it was enough to demonstrate that the solvent had doubts about the existence of the obligation.
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The Polish Code of Obligations in Article 131, point 3 granted the solves -in exceptional circumstances -the right to bring a claim for recovery even if he was aware that the obligation did not exist. The conditions are formulated as follows:
-he transferred the benefi ts not of his accord. Here the admissibility of the claim for recovery resulted a contrario from the initial part of the provisions of Article 131. For example, in the course of an execution against the property of an alleged debtor, a certain sum of money was seized (the offi cial enforcement is treated as a solvens' own act) and the judgment of an appellate court, or an enforceable judgment of a court of the fi rst instance, was enforced , but then due to some extraordindary legal procedures, the debtor obtained a favourable judgment;
95
-if at the time of the transfer he reserved for himself the right to claim the benefi t back, which, however, could be justifi ed if the solvens was sure that he did transfer the beneft but was not yet able to prove it, or when the solvens did not know if the debt was enforceable; if a requisite condition was satisfi ed; or if his representative had already transferred the benefi t. Or, anxious to avoid the negative consequences of falling onto arrears, he discharged the obligation, at the same time reserving the right to claim back the transferred benefi ts should new circumstances justifying a repudiation of the obligation come to light. Ludwik Domański points out that the admission of exclusion clauses in obligations concerning the transfer of benefi ts shows due respect for the freedom of contract.
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-if the transfer took place under duress -both psychological (threats, Article 41) and legal coercion. For example, when the solvens paid another person's debt to avoid the auctioning of his own assets in somebody else's possession; if the solvens paid another person's debt to avoid the seizure under execution mistakenly directed against his own property; 
c) Moral turpitude -in pari delicto
Article 132 bars the claim for recovery of a solvens whose conduct was tainted with moral turpitude. Whereas the hypothesis of paragraph 1 of Article 132 refers to a solvens who willingly paid his part of the deal in return for the performance of an act that was illegal, violated good manners, or was intended to induce the accipiens to commit such an act, the hypothesis of paragraph 2 refers to a solvent who fulfi lled an obligation with a turpitudinous purpose (causa impulsiva, causa remota), and in the litigation has to bear the taint of turpitude. 99 As the latter hypothesis encompasses also the cases covered in paragraph 1, it need not have been included in the KZ. It was done so because, we are told, it covers "the exceptionally drastic cases". 100 This is plainly unconvincing as the provisions of either paragraph have the same legal consequences and the cases described in paragraph 1 are covered by paragraph 2.
Roman law is clear about not allowing a party implicated in wrongdoing to take advange of the law to press its claim, i.e. nemo auditur turpitudinem suam allegans. This maxim forbids the admission of a claim for recovery from a solvens whose case is founded on an illegal or immoral act. When both parties are equally culpable for a wrong (in pari causa), the courts would not get involved and uphold the status quo, in accordance with the maxim in pari turpitidine melior esse debet causa possidentis. 101 Alternately, the law could react to that situation by ordering the seizure of the contested benefi t. The latter solution has the backing of Article 168 of the Lwów Committee Draft: "Whether the object of the transfer is seized, depends on the provisions of public law, which the presiding judge should never lose sight of" (in fi ne). 102 The regulations of Jan Halberda achieve a morally odious outcome then -in accordance with Article 56 -it was invalid, which in turn opened the way for a claim for the recovery of the transferred benefi t following Article 130, but only for the solvens not tainted with turpitude (as stipulated by Article 132, para. 2). For example, this condition could be used by a solvens who off ered a benefi t to an accipiens in order to induce him to obey the law or dissuade him from committing acts prohibited by law. If Article 132 was left out, the obligations listed there (e.g. an agreement to perform an act prohibited by law) and regarded invalid ex lege (Article 56), could nevertheless be enforced with the help of a condiction. This would have been possible because -following Article 130 -the invalidity of the agreement opened the way for bringing a claim for the recovery of a transferred benefi t. This argument shows that Article 132 which blocks that path to a solvens in pari causa is in fact indispensable. It can be argued further that just as under Roman law it was possible with the help of condictio causa data causa non secuta to compel the other side to perform unactionable innominate contracts so it should be possible for a promisee to use the condition to make the promisor to deliver -now suppose the promisor were a hitman and the job was to kill.
However, Article 132 could not be invoked to fend off a claim for compensation. Yet, in a situation when both the giver and the recipient are equally at fault (in pari delicto), but the guilt or disgrace (turpitudo) of one party was caused by the unscrupulous conduct of the other party, the former (the victim) is granted the claim for damages against the latter. 
d) Interest
Provisions setting certain limits to claims for the recovery of interest can be found in Articles 88 and 89. So Article 88 denies relief to a debtor who willingly paid undue interest and wants to recover the sum of money in question or to have it set off against the principal.
Jan Halberda
That said, it should be noted that the KZ, like the systems of law, expands the ambit of the accipiens' liability if he accepts a benefi t in bad faith (Article 133, para. 2). By doing this the legislators affi rm the general rule that an accipiens who knowingly acquires benefi ts he is not owed cannot expect relief from the courts. Austrian and Swiss courts applied stricter liability whenever they saw there had been good reasons for the accipiens to be in doubt (following §1437 ABGB and Article 64 OR). 115 Meanwhile, for Polish and German courts bad faith meant positive knowledge of the wrongdoing, and not just negligent ignorance. The burden of proving it, in accordance with Article 133, para. 2, lay with the solvens. Art. 133 para. 2 was always applied in cases condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam: the accipiens, who was at fault on account of turpitude could not plead ignorance of the law, and his bad faith was presumed. 116 Roman law treats an accipiens guilty of bad faith with great severity, no better than a thief. Austrian and French law ( § §335 and 1437 ABGB 117 ; Articles 1378-1379 CN respectively) treat an accipiens guilty of bad faith on a par with a possessor in bad faith and therefore liable for "the capital as well as the fruits", diminution, deterioration or loss by accident of the property or assets in question. An analysis of Article 127 in connection with Article 133 indicates that KZ too makes the accipiens in bad faith liable for any loss, even if caused by a fortuitous event. The German code limits the liability, or the scope of restitution, to those losses, including uncollected fruits or interest on a loan, that happened through the accipiens' fault or negligence. 118 So, taking into account both the presumptions and the scope of stricter liability of the accipiens in bad faith, the authors of the Polish Code of Obligation took the middle road of moderation, more lenient than the Austrian model and stricter than the German one.
The provisions concerning the restitution of unjust enrichment could also be applied in cases of undue payment that did not result in unjust enrichment (like the case of the mail order company mentioned above). Roman Longchamps de Bérier was alone in discerning that special case. His solution was to require the recipient to make restitution in kind and to pay the expenses: if the object in question was aff ected by use, the contract and the concomitant obligation to pay did come into being (the acceptance of the off er can be inferred from the off eree's conduct). If, however, if the object was lost while being delivered, no contract was created and the risk of loss must be borne by the off eror (cf. Article 69).
Conclusion
There is a widespread consensus among legal scholars that the authors of the Polish Code of Obligations of 1933 looked for inspiration to the Swiss Obligationenrecht.
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This analysis of the functioning of the concept of undue payment in the KZ and in some contemporary European legal systems confi rms Paweł Księżak's thesis of the KZ's indebtedness to the German BGB and the Swiss OR in that fi eld.
121 Yet the KZ does not copy the solutions of these two codes of law. The most important diff erence is the separation of unjust enrichment and undue payment; and there are more diff erences on the level of specifi c regulations. In contrast to German law, the KZ does require that the solvens' error justifying the use a condiction has to be an exculpable. In contrast to the OR, the solvens is not required to prove that he was unaware of the nonexistence of the obligation at the time he transferred the benefi t. There are even more dissimilaries between the KZ and Napoleonic Code, the KZ and the Austrian ABGB; they are due chiefl y to the structure of the older codes. In particular, each of them handles the obligation to restore the object of undue payment in a markedly diff erent way -here the Polish approach draws on the BGB and the OR.
Finally, any comparison of the current Polish Civil Code with its predecessor would show how remarkably similar they are. For the most part the present-day regulations follow those of the KZ. Probably the most signifi cant departure from the old code is the replacement of the exclusion of condiction (Article 132 KZ) by the action of forfeiture of the object of transfer tainted with moral turpitude (Article 412 KC). The fact that Code of Obligations of 1933 has undergone no substantial revision in the course of subsequent reforms of civil law is the best proof of its outstanding merit. 
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